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I.

INTRODUCTION

An African-American employee walks into a warehouse he had
entered hundreds of times over the course of his employment.1 It is
there he encounters, dangling for all to see, a hangman’s noose.2 The
simple imagery of a noose - swaying eerily above - invokes a sense
of evil, wrongdoing, and fear. One does not have to encounter the
object to sense this. Mere knowledge of the noose’s bloodstained
history can incite these emotions all on its own. The hangman’s
noose is indelibly linked to lynching, the Ku Klux Klan, and the
murdering of thousands of African-Americans.3 Despite this

1. These are the underlying facts of Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 644 F. App'x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 2016).
2. Id.
3. See Tuskgee Institute, Lynchings: By Year and Race, 1882-1968,
CHESNUTTARCHIVE.ORG, www.chesnuttarchive.org/classroom/lynching_table_y
ear.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (calculating that from the year 1882 to
1968, 3,445 African Americans were lynched in the United States).
137
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heinous past, the Ninth Circuit rule the noose was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive enough for a plaintiff to prevail on a hostile work
environment claim.4 This is the story of Jon Henry.5
The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of Henry’s hostile work
environment claim, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and against the University of California, forms the groundwork for
this comment.6 A hostile work environment cause of action requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate “conduct that was sufficiently severe or
pervasive enough to alter the conditions of their employment.”7
Henry's alleged incident involving the hanging noose was deemed
not to have met this standard by the District Court and the Ninth
Circuit8 —thus creating a split among the circuits.9 Following the
affirmation by the Ninth Circuit, Henry filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court proposing the issue
of whether "a hangman's noose, intentionally placed in an AfricanAmerican employee's work area by his non-African-American
supervisor, is sufficiently severe as a matter of law to constitute race
harassment under Title VII?”10 The dark and complex history of the
noose combined with the current status of race relations within the
United States elevates the significance of the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision and the Supreme Court’s denial of Henry's writ.11 Not only
did Henry’s petition propose a volatile issue, but it presented an
opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to acknowledge
the connotation the noose holds, and its place in American history.
4. Henry, 644 F. App’x 787 at 788.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 789.
7. This element was first recognized in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court cemented the precedent in Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
8. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1087
(N.D. Cal. 2014); Henry, 644 F. App'x 787 at 789.
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Henry, 644 F. App’x 787 (2016). Henry
alleges in his petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S Supreme Court that the
Ninth Circuit's holding within his case is contrary to what the 7th, 10th, 11th,
and D.C. Circuit courts have held in similar actions involving isolated incidents
of nooses within a place of employment. Id. According to Henry, each of these
circuits have held that an isolated incident of a noose is sufficiently severe or
pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the victim's employment. Id. The
alleged circuit split will be discussed later on within this comment. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Giovanni Russonello, Race Relations are at Lowest Point in Obama
Presidency, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/
07/14/us/most-americans-hold-grim-view-of-race-relations-poll-finds.html?_r=0
(citing a poll that stated “six in ten Americans say race relations are growing
worse, up from 38% a year ago.”); see also Jim Norman, U.S. Worries About Race
Relations Reach a New High, GALLUP (Apr. 11, 2016), www.gallup.com/poll/
190574/worries-race-relations-reach-new-high.aspx (showing “that more than a
third (35%) of Americans now say they are worried a great deal about race
relations in the U.S.—which is higher than at any time since Gallup first asked
the question in 2001.”); Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 303
(2016).
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The denial of Henry’s petition intensifies the demand for another
method in which to recognize the atrocious history and significance
of the hangman’s noose.
This Comment will begin by summarizing the history of the
hangman’s noose and its legacy within the United States. The legal
aspects and the formation of the hostile work environment claim
will then be discussed. The circuit split created by the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Henry and the aberrations posited in the
holding will be analyzed, along with the flaws inherent in the use of
an objective test as applied to a hostile environment cases.12 Finally,
this Comment will propose that the U.S. Congress should legislate
a per se statute for hostile work environment claims that would
automatically deem the usage of a noose severe or pervasive enough
to alter the victim’s working conditions.

II. BACKGROUND
In today’s world, it is a rare occurrence to see or hear about one
being lynched due to an unlawful hanging.13 In spite of this decline,
the noose remains as equally haunting and sinister as when mob
justice employed it to achieve their racist objectives.14 To truly
comprehend what the hangman’s noose represents today and the
emotions it can conjure, one must know and understand its history.
Part 1 of this section will provide an overview of the noose and its
prominence before and after the Reconstruction Era while Part 2
will discuss its prevalence in America today. A brief synopsis of Title
VII and a hostile work environment cause of action will be given in
Part 3. The facts and resulting decision of Henry v. Regents of the
Univ. of California15 will then be provided in Part 4.

A. The History of the Noose
The ominous aura surrounding the noose derives from its link
with the practice of lynching.16 Although the roots of this execution
12. Henry, 644 F. App'x 787 at 788; Henry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067 at 1087.
13. See William L Ziglar, The Decline of Lynching in America, 63 INT. SOCIAL
SCIENCE REV. 14-25, 23 (1988)(discussing the general decline in lynching from
the Reconstruction Era to the 1960s).
14. See James Schuler, The Ominous Symbolism of the Noose, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2014), www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shuler-noose-hate-crimes
-20141028-story.html (affirming that although lynching has declined since the
1930s, the noose has “become a stand-in for vigilantism, for murder by
community, an unveiled threat, and a symbol to brandish to keep blacks in their
place”).
15. Henry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067; Henry, 644 F. App'x 787.
16. JAMES ELBERT CUTLER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (1969). Cutler examines and
discusses the beginning of lynching within the United States during the
Revolutionary War and goes on to discuss accounts of lynching during the
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method can be traced back to the Revolutionary War,17 the notoriety
of lynching within the United States arose from its use to hang
African-Americans within the years of 1865 to 1968.18 During the
Reconstruction Era, a period that followed the South’s loss in the
Civil War, America saw its first surge in the lynching of AfricanAmericans.19 The most considerable increase began, however, in
1880 and would last until 1930.20
1. Lynching During the Reconstruction Era
From 1867 until 1877, the South was occupied by Union Troops
under the Military Reconstruction Acts.21 Initiatives within the Act
allowed former slaves to vote and hold political offices—notions that
were radical to Southerners22 whose economy and social order prior
to the Civil War was dependent upon the institution of slavery.23
With the initiatives under the Reconstruction Act and the passage
of the Emancipation Proclamation, former slaves rose to the same
social rank of their owners overnight.24 A Southerner’s way of life
was effectively demolished and white supremacy was in peril.25
Threatened by the African-Americans’ rise in status, white
Southerners turned to lynching and mob justice to reassert their
dominance.26 A supremacy that had once been achieved through
slavery “would now be restored through terror.”27 In a summary
slavery movement. Id.; CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, AFRICAN AMERICANS
CONFRONT LYNCHING: STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA XV (2009).
17. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 23. The term “lynch” is said to have derived
from a type of law administered by Colonel Charles Lynch during the
Revolutionary War. Id.; WALDREP, supra note 16, at 2. According to Waldrep,
lynching originated during the American Revolution when Patriots hanged or
whipped captured Tories. Although lynching is widely used to reference the act
of hanging, the term encompasses multiple methods of death. Id.
18. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, History of
Lynchings, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE, www.naacp.org/history-of-lynchings/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
19. MICHAEL J. PFEIFER, ROUGH JUSTICE: LYNCHING AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1874-1947 13 (2004).
20. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1919).
21. The Independence Hall Association, Reconstruction, USHISTORY.ORG,
www.ushistory.org/us/35.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
22. Id.
23. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 137-38.
24. E.B. Beck & Stewart E. Tolnay, Violence toward African Americans in
the Era of the White Lynch Mob, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES
ACROSS TIME AND PLACE 121-44, 122 (1995).
25. PFEIFER, supra note 19, at 13. Pfeifer finds that the Emancipation
Proclamation had upset certain notions of white supremacy in the South such
as the “slaveholder’s recourse to corporal punishment and the slave patrol’s
police power.” Id.
26. Id.
27. Equal Justice Initiative, A Summary Report: Lynching in America:
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report of lynching in America, the Equal Justice Initiative described
the practice during this time period as “violent, public acts of
torture” that created a fearful environment which “reinforced a
legacy of racial inequality that has never been adequately
addressed in America.”28 It was also during this era that the Ku
Klux Klan first emerged.29 The KKK’s message was simple, but
ghastly— to put blacks back in their place.30 Donning white masks
and robes, the Klansmen instilled fear within the Black community
with their use of the hangman’s noose for the systematic lynching
of African-Americans.31
Throughout the Reconstruction era, little effort was expelled
by local, state, or federal authorities to curb the increasingly violent
and lawless white supremacists.32 As a result, the perfect
environment for “a wave of counterrevolutionary terror” that “lacks
a counterpart in the American experience” was created.33 However,
Congress achieved temporary success in 1871 by enacting the Ku
Klux Klan Act—a law that extended the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to KKK cases.34 The Act’s passage effectively led to nine
counties subjected to martial law, thousands of arrests, and the fall
of the KKK.35 Despite these successes, however, the KKK would see
a resurgence in the early 1900s.36 Moreover, lynching would
continue on in the KKK’s absence.
2. Lynching from the Years 1880 to 1930
When the Reconstruction era came to an end, Union troops
were withdrawn from the South and the white Southerners quickly
regained political power.37 It was here, from 1880 to 1930, that
Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
www.eji.org/sites/default/files/lynching-in-america-second-edition-summary.pd
f 10 (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
28. Id.
29. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 139.
30. Id.
31. Jeannine Bell, Article, The Hangman’s Noose and the Lynch Mob: Hate
Speech and the Jena Six, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 333 (2009).
32. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 27, at 8.
33. Id. at 3.
34. A&E Television Networks, LLC, Ku Klux Klan Act Passed by Congress,
HISTORY.COM, www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ku-klux-act-passed-by-con
gress (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 27, at 8; EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR 24
(2015). After the white Southerners regained political power, all former
Confederate states “rewrote their constitutions to include provisions restricting
voter rights with poll taxes, literacy tests, and felon disenfranchisement.” Id.
These Constitutions effectively “institutionalized” the racial inequality that
existed, allowed for the creation of the Jim Crow laws, and set off the “second
slavery” era. Id.
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lynching would become a common practice in the South.38
Maneuvering around the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibited
slavery “except as punishment for crime,”39 politicians, newspapers,
and cartoonists began characterizing African-Americans as
threatening beasts and criminals who needed to be controlled.40 One
radical example of this is the movie, “The Birth of a Nation”, which
portrayed African-American men as unintelligent and sexually
aggressive towards white women.41 Due to these depictions, during
the early 1900s African-American men were increasingly accused of
murder and raping or attacking white women42—for all of which,
lynching was seen as the appropriate response.43 It is not readily
known whether these crimes were truly committed, for a majority
of these hangings were extra-judicial.44 The accused would be
forcibly taken from the custody of the law and lynched by mobs or
societies such as the KKK.45 However, a 2015 report found that
many of the African-American victims “were murdered without
being accused of any crime” and were killed “for minor social
transgression or for demanding basic rights and fair treatment.”46
While overt racism was a prevailing motive for lynching in the
1900s, state complicity in the practice perpetuated the act and
allowed for mob justice to continue to run rampant.47 In one case, a
South Carolina Governor refused to indict certain mob leaders who
brought about the lynching of one Willis Jackson.48 In addition to
refusing to charge the wrongdoers, the Governor expressed regret
for not having lead the gang himself.49 Throughout the 1920s, there
was a Congressional effort to pass federal legislation that addressed
nationwide lynching.50 However, Southern Democrats effectively
38. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
supra note 20, at 6; EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 37, at 28. The ratio
of black lynching victims to white in this era had increased to more than 6 to 1.
Id. After 1900, the ratio was 17 to 1. Id. Professor Stewart Tolnay, using this
data, concluded that “lynching in the South became increasingly and exclusively
a matter of white mobs murdering African-Americans—a routine and
systematic effort to subjugate the African-American minority.” Id.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
40. E.B. Beck and Stewart E. Tolnay, supra note 24, at 122.
41. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (David W. Griffith Corp. 1915). The movie
employed white actors who would don black face to portray African-American
men. Id.
42. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
supra note 20, at 6. The research found that the crime “attacks upon white
women” would often have “no stronger evidence than an African-American
entering the room of a woman or brushing up against her.” Id.
43. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 27, at 11.
44. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 152.
45. Id.
46. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 27, at 5.
47. E.B. Beck and Steward E. Tolnay, supra note 24, at 123.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Steven J. Jager, Dyer Anti-Legislation Bill (1922), BLACKPAST.ORG, ww
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blocked the anti-lynching bill (deemed the Dyer Bill) each time it
was presented to the Senate.51 Ultimately, the legislation was
defeated three times.52 Another anti-lynching legislation movement
was taken up in the 1930s with the Costigan Wagner Bill, but again,
Southern opposition proved too resilient.53
Lynching would ultimately begin to see a decrease in the 1910s
to the 1930s.54 This decline has been attributed to multiple factors
such as Congressional efforts to pass anti-lynching legislation,55 the
creation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People and their work in raising awareness of the issue,56 and
general urbanization of the South.57 While sporadic lynching would
occur until the 1960s, its numbers would never reach the height it
did during the 1880s to the early 1900s.58 Although diligent
reporting on lynching was not prevalent until the late 1870s, new
studies have determined that from 1877 to 1950, 3,959 AfricanAmericans were hanged within the U.S.59

B. Prevalence of the Noose Today
Today, the noose is a lasting remnant of the fear, intimidation,
and blatant racism African-Americans endured throughout the
19th and early 20th centuries.60 The Equal Justice Initiative
w.blackpast.org/aah/dyer-anti-lynching-bill-1922 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
51. Id.
52. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Oldest and
Boldest, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
www.naacp.org/oldest-and-boldest/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
53. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, NAACP
History: Costigan Wagner Bill, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE, www.naacp.org/oldest-and-boldest/naacp-history-costiga
n-wagner-act/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
54. Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the
United States, 1880-1950, TEACHERSINSTITUTE.YALE.EDU, teachersinstitute.ya
le.edu/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2017).
55. ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING,
1909-1950, at 22 (1980). Zangrando notes the decrease in lynching numbers
could be attributed to Southern whites suppressing the news of mob violence
due to their worry that “outside pressure might produce a federal anti-lynching
law.” Id.
56. Id. at 22. The NAACP was founded following a race riot in Springfield,
Illinois in which two African-Americans were lynched. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 27, at 8.
60. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
STEMMING THE TIDE OF INJUSTICE AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS
(2007)(discussing the hanging of nooses at a school in Jena, Louisiana, and
noting the hangman’s noose is a symbol of the racist, segregation-era violence
enacted on blacks.) It is an unmistakable symbol of violence and terror that
whites used to demonstrate their hatred for blacks. Id. It was used to send a
message to blacks in general about respecting the racial boundaries and to not
get out of place. Id.
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contends that this lynching era “significantly marginalized black
people in the country’s political, economic, and social systems . . .
[and] inflicted deep traumatic and psychological wounds . . . on the
entire African-American community.”61 Notwithstanding the
emotional connotations of the noose, sightings of the object are still
common today. One such occurrence took place within a school yard
in Jena, Louisiana, in 2007.62 Following the incident, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People declared a State
of Emergency63 in which they reported that forty-three noose
hangings had occurred since early 2006.64
Relevant to this Comment, there have also been numerous
claims of nooses appearing within the workplace. The latest
statistical data concerning these allegations comes from an
interview conducted in 2000 with the chairwoman of the Federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ida L. Castro.65
Castro indicated the Commission has witnessed, since the late
1990s, "a disturbing national trend of increased racial harassment
cases involving hangman's nooses in the workplace.”66 At that time,
the EEOC had filed 20 racial harassment claims that involved the
allegation of nooses found within a place of employment67. The use
of physical objects, such as the noose or Ku Klux Klan attire, are
alleged in 5.8% of all hostile work environment claims.68 In January
of 2017, the EEOC issued proposed guidance on hostile work
environment claims.69 The purported reason for the guidance was
because one third of the 90,000 charges the agency received in 2015
were workplace harassment claims.70 It noted that conduct not
directed at an employee, such as the display of a noose, can
contribute to a hostile work environment cause of action.71

61. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 37, at 62.
62. Richard G. Jones, In Louisiana, a Tree, a Fight and a Question of Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2007), www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/us/19jena.html.
63. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Chairwoman
Responds to Surge of Workplace Noose Incidents at NAACP Annual Convention,
EEOC.GOV (July 13, 2000), www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-13-00-b.cfm.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Pat K. Chew and Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law,
27 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 74 (2006).
69. Robert G. Brady and Katherine M. Bogard, EEOC’S Proposed
Enforcement Guidance on Harassment: Should You Care?, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL
(Apr. 7, 2017), www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202783257769/EEOCs-Prop
osed-Enforcement-Guidance-on-Harassment-Should-You-Care?slreturn=2017
0314175324.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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1. Congressional Efforts Concerning the Hangman’s Noose
Following the trend of the Reconstruction and postReconstruction eras, the U.S. Congress has taken little action
regarding the noose in today’s world despite its continued use.72 In
2005, the United States Senate recognized the storied past of the
hangman’s noose and their failed efforts to fight against lynching
by introducing Resolution 39.73 This resolution apologized to the
victims of lynching and the descendants of those victims for the
failure of the Senate to enact anti-lynching legislation.74 Before
voting on the resolution commenced, Senator Mary Landrieu stated,
"[t]here may be no other injustice in American history for which the
Senate so uniquely bears responsibility.”75 Anti-lynching legislation
has never been passed by the United States’ Congress.
Furthermore, “no prominent monument or memorial exists to
commemorate the thousands of African-Americans who were
lynched.”76
2. Judicial Decisions Involving the Hangman’s Noose
In the context of hostile work environment claims, the judiciary
has seen multiple cases alleging the use of the object. It appears in
a variety of circumstances—not always hanging from the ceiling of
a warehouse. For example, in Henderson v. Int'l Union, the plaintiff
found a noose at her work station that was made from a piece of
flexible rubber.77 The plaintiff in Williams v. New York City Housing
Authority walked into their supervisor's office and noticed a noose
the supervisor kept hung on his wall for display.78 In Allen v.
Michigan Dep't of Corrections, a note, written on a department
form, was signed with the letters, KKK, and contained a drawing of
a stick figure that had a noose around its neck.79
No matter where the noose appears, however, the judicial
system has consistently condemned the object and what it stands
for.80 The Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have found
72. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 37, at 62 (observing that
“state officials’ indifference to and complicity in lynchings created enduring
national and institutional wounds that we have not yet confronted or begun to
heal.”).
73. S. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005-2006).
74. Id.
75. Avis Thomas-Lester, A Senate Apology for History on Lynching, THE
WASH. POST (June 14, 2005), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/06/13/AR2005061301720.html.
76. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 37, at 63.
77. Henderson v. Int'l Union, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1250 (D. Kan. 2003).
78. Williams v. New York City Housing. Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
79. Allen v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 165 F. 3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 1999).
80. Porter v. Erie Foods Int'l, Inc., 576 F. 3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009)
(articulating the "noose is a visceral symbol of the deaths of thousands of
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incidents involving a noose at a place of employment sufficiently
severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the victim's
work conditions.81
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black
impacted State laws concerning the hangman’s noose.82 The 2003
opinion determined that a State can enact a statue banning crossburning, that was done with the intent to intimidate, without
running afoul of the First Amendment.83 A burning cross was often
employed by the KKK in the early 1900s to terrorize AfricanAmericans.84 The Anti-Defamation League recognizes the image of
a burning cross as “one of the most potent hate symbols in the
United States.”85
Since Virginia v. Black, half of the states in the U.S. have
outlawed cross-burning that is being used to intimidate.86
Moreover, several jurisdictions’ statues are written in a way that
condemns all symbols that “are calculated to intimidate or threaten”
thereby effectively banning the hangman’s noose as well.87
Although these statues do not directly reference the hangman’s
noose, they have also not been overturned due to First Amendment
issues.88

C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
While specific actions to combat the use of the hangman’s noose
were not taken by the U.S. Congress or the judiciary, the federal
government did begin to explicitly acknowledge racial
discrimination in the early 1960s. In the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,89 the call to pass

African-Americans at the hand of lynch mobs."); see also Tademy v. Union Pac.
Corp., 614 F. 3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2008) (positing "the noose is among the
most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of
violence."); see also Burkes v. Holder, 953 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D.D.C.
2013)(specifying the "noose is a powerful symbol of racism and violence against
African Americans.”).
81. Porter, 576 F. 3d 629 at 636; Hollins v. Delta Airlines, 238 F. 3d 1255
(10th Cir. 2001); Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F. 2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir.
1989); Burkes, 953 F. Supp. 2d 167 at 179.
82. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
83. Id. at 363.
84. Anti-Defamation League, Burning Cross, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/burning-cross (last visited
Mar. 30, 2017).
85. Id.
86. Kathleen Ann Ruane and Charles Doyle, Burning Crosses, Hangman’s
Nooses, and the Like: State Statutes that Proscribe the Use of Symbols of Fear
and Violence with the Intent to Threaten, FAS.ORG (Oct. 5, 2007), fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/RL34200.pdf.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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federal legislation combating racial discrimination intensified.90
Pressure from civil rights activists in the form of boycotts and sitins led Congress to ultimately enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964.91
Encompassed within the Act, Title VII prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, sex, national origin and religion within the
private employment sector.92 Although sex, national origin, and
religion are codified within Title VII, the principal purpose of Title
VII is to prevent and proscribe discrimination within the work place
on the basis of race or color.93
1. The Development of Hostile Work Environment Claims
Under Title VII
The implementation of Title VII paved the way for the hostile
work environment claim to develop. Rogers v. EEOC, decided in
1971, became the first case to explicitly acknowledge a cause of
action arising from a discriminatory work environment.94 Brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,95 the respondent,
Mrs. Josephine Chavez, alleged her employer’s policy of segregating
patients based on race, made her uncomfortable.96 Despite this
feeling of discomfort, the District Court held Mrs. Chavez had failed
to show she was aggrieved.97 The alleged conduct did not force Mrs.
Chavez to treat only patients of a certain race or origin, it merely
offended her.98 Mrs. Chavez’s discomfort with her employer’s
conduct, the District Court concluded, was not enough to raise a
Title VII cause of action.99
The Fifth Circuit disagreed.100 Judge Goldberg noted that
working environments which contain enough discrimination as to
effect ones emotional and psychological well-being are well within
the target range of Title VII.101 The Fifth Circuit found the scope of

90. John F. Kennedy, Civil Rights Address, AMERICANRHETORIC.COM, www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcivilrights.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
91. Robert Belton, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 Symposium: Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 432 (2005).
92. 42 USCS § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1972).
93. Clare Tower Putnam, Comment, When Can a Law Firm Discriminate
Among Its Own Employees to Meet a Client’s Request? Reflections on the ACC’s
Call to Action, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 664 (2007) (Congressman Celler
asserting, “You must remember the basic purpose of Title VII is to prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color.”).
94. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234, 238 (1971).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 237.
97. Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 425 (1970).
98. Id. at 425.
99. Id.
100. Rogers, 454 F. 2d 234 at 238.
101. Id. (explaining “[o]ne can readily envision working environments so
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Title VII to be broad—protecting an employees’ psychological wellbeing as well as economic from an employer’s abuse.102 However,
they noted that an employer’s “mere utterance of an ethnic of racial
epithet which engenders offensive feelings” will not rise to a Title
VII violation.103 At the same time, the Fifth Circuit held that a
discriminatory atmosphere could constitute a violation under Title
VII.104 Thus, the foundation was laid for what has become the
modern hostile work environment claim.105
Although the seminal case of Rogers involved racial
discrimination,106 the jurisprudence of hostile work environment
claims was developed through the adjudication of sexual
harassment claims rather than racially motivated cases.107
Following Rogers, lower courts consistently held that the elements
needed to prove a sexual harassment claim were the same as those
needed within a hostile work environment cause of action.108 The
first discriminatory harassment case to reach the Supreme Court,
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, decided in 1986, cemented this
precedent.109 Following Meritor, a plaintiff must prove that “he was
subject to unwelcome harassment; the harassment was based on his
race; the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of the employee's work environment by creating a hostile
or abusive situation; and there is a basis for employer liability.”110
To develop the “sufficiently severe and pervasive”111 standard
more thoroughly, the Supreme Court addressed another hostile
work environment claim in Harris v. Forklift Sys.112 While
upholding the Meritor standard, the Court further expanded upon
the severe or pervasive test by noting the conduct must be
objectively and subjectively perceived as hostile.113 This
determination, the Court decided, should be made by looking at the
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers, and I think Section 703 of
Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 239.
104. Id.
105. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (stating that
“Rogers was apparently the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon
a discriminatory work environment.”).
106. 454 F. 2d 234 at 238.
107. Chew and Kelley, supra note 68, at 74.
108. 454 F. 2d 234.
109. 477 U.S. 57 at 67. A female bank employee, Michelle Vinson, alleged
her male supervisor, Sidney Taylor, had publicly fondled her and asked her for
sexual demands. Id. In order to keep her job, Ms. Vinson complied out of fear.
Id. Over the course of her employment, she alleges they engaged in intercourse
40-50 times, Taylor had exposed himself to her, and had also forcibly raped her
on multiple occasions. Id. at 59-61.
110. Id. at 67.
111. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 at 67.
112. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
113. Id. at 370.
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totality of the circumstances.114 Relevant factors such as the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, were listed by the Court as
being indicative of a hostile or abusive environment.115 Yet,
confusion within the lower courts still existed over what definitively
constituted a hostile environment.116

D. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of California117
On March 15, 2016, the confusion created by Meritor over what
constituted a hostile environment culminated in the Ninth Circuit’s
dismissal of Jon Henry’s hostile work environment claim.118 The
decision of the District Court to grant summary judgment in favor
of the defendants over Henry’s claim was affirmed.119 Henry, an
African-American man, was employed at the University of
California, San Francisco.120 Throughout his time with the
University, Henry alleged he suffered “severe race-based
harassment.”121 One instance, that formed the basis for his hostile
work environment claim, occurred on July 10, 2012.122 On that day,
Henry alleged he walked into the inventory warehouse and
discovered a noose that was hung by being taped to a box.123 Henry
indicated he felt the noose was “placed there to intimidate, harass,
and threaten him.”124 The defendants alleged that the employee
who allegedly tied and hung the noose to the box, Danny Paik, had
done so because “it was the most challenging knot he could think
of”—not due to any racial connotations.125 Although Paik admitted
committing the offense, later investigation by the defendants

114. Id. at 371.
115. Id. at 370.
116. Maria Milano, Comment, Toward a New Standard: Hope for Greater
Uniformity in the Treatment of Hostile Work Environment Claims, 78 MARQ. L.
REV. 190, 194 (1994); see also Harris, 114 S. Ct. 367 at 372 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (Justice Scalia noted that adding the reasonable person standard to
the test for a hostile work environment claim did not provide any clarity. It
simply allows “virtually unguided juries to decide whether…conduct engaged in
or permitted by an employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of
damages.”)
117. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 644 F. App’x 787, 788 (2016).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 788-89. The Plaintiff had also brought three retaliation claims.
Id.
120. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1073.
123. Henry, 644 Fed. Appx. 787 at 788.
124. Henry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067 at 1073.
125. Id.
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determined he had not.126 The true culprit’s identity was never
confirmed.127
Narrowing in on Henry’s hostile work environment claim, the
Court focused their attention on whether the incident with the
noose, as an isolated event, was sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to alter Henry’s work conditions.128 Although the court
acknowledged the connotations of the noose,129 they ultimately
concluded that one incident involving the object was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive enough.130 In affirming the District Court’s
opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted the isolated incident was not
extremely serious as to alter his employment.131 Henry’s allegations
did not amount to “discriminatory changes in the terms and
conditions of his employment.”132

III. ANALYSIS
The essence of this Comment stems from the holding in Henry
which placed the Ninth Circuit at ends with the Eleventh, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuit.133 Part A of this section discusses case law from
these circuits that concern the severity of the hangman’s noose
while Part B addresses the mistakes made by the District Court
within the Henry decision.134 Additionally, the objective test—used
to determine the severity of conduct within hostile work
environment claims—as well as its alternative, the reasonable
black person standard, will be examined.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1086.
129. See id. at 1087 (acknowledging that “even if the noose was not directed
specifically at plaintiff, because of the legacy of slavery and its aftermath, a
reasonable African-American would have been offended by being confronted
with such an emotionally-charged symbol in the workplace.”).
130. Id.
131. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 644 Fed. Appx. 787, 788 (9th Cir.
2016).
132. Id.
133. 644 Fed. Appx. 787 at 788.
134. Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F. 2d 1503, 1504 (11th Cir.
1989); Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F. 3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014); Porter
v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F. 3d 629, 630 (7th Cir. 2009); United States Court
of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Jerome Cole v. Board of Trustees of Northern
Illinois University, et al., CASELAW.FINDLAW.COM (Sept. 27, 2016) caselaw.
findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1749187.html; Hollins v. Deltha Airlines, 238 F. 3d
1255, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001); Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1141
(10th Cir. 2008).
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A. The Circuit Court Split
1. The Eleventh Circuit
The Ninth Circuit’s decision regarding the severity of the
hangman’s noose in Henry departs from the uniform precedent its
sister circuits has developed over the years.135 Recognition of the
noose’s severity in the context of a hostile work environment claim
was first discussed in 1989 by the Eleventh Circuit in Vance v.
Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co.136 The plaintiff, a black woman, was
working for Southern Bell as a switchboard operator.137 A week
after transferring to a new department, the plaintiff found what she
believed to be a noose hanging from a light fixture above her work
station.138 Two days later, the plaintiff found another noose hanging
in the same location.139 While holding that the District Court had
erred in determining the severity of the alleged harassment
incidents, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[t]he grossness of hanging
an object resembling a noose at the work station of a black female
is self-evident.”140
The Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed and expanded their
belief as to the severity of the noose in Adams v. Austal, U.S.A.,
L.L.C.141 Here, an objectively hostile work environment was found
for a plaintiff who had only heard about the hanging of a noose
within his place of employment.142 While recognizing that the
plaintiff’s experience was less severe than those who had seen the
noose, the court still declared the object a “severe form of racial
harassment.”143
2. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, relying on the precedent laid out in the
Eleventh, followed suit in 2009 with Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc.144
The plaintiff, Mr. Porter, was the only African-American employee
scheduled during the third shift and he alleged that on multiple
occasions he was shown a noose by his co-workers.145 Quoting the
dissent in Vance,146 the court found the incidents to be sufficiently
135. Porter, 576 F. 3d 629 at 636; Hollins, 238 F. 3d 1255; Vance, 863 F. 2d
1503 at 1511; Burkes, 953 F. Supp. 2d 167 at 179.
136. Vance, 863 F. 2d 1503 at 1504.
137. Id. at 1506.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1511.
141. Adams v. Austal, 754 F. 3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014).
142. Id. at 1253.
143. Id.
144. Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F. 3d 629, 630 (7th Cir. 2009).
145. Id. at 632-34.
146. Id.:
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severe as to rise to a hostile work environment claim.147 In a more
recent decision, the Seventh Circuit cited Porter148 and stated they
would not “flatly reject as insufficiently severe an entire set of cases”
involving the hangman’s noose given its atrocious history.149
3. The Tenth Circuit
The plaintiff in Hollins v. Delta Airlines, decided in the Tenth
Circuit, found several hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling
in his work area and two other areas at his place of employment.150
Rejecting the District Court’s notion that the presence of the nooses
was “uncontrovertibly innocuous”,151 the Tenth Circuit argued the
incidents precluded summary judgment on the hostile work
environment claim. In a more vehement decision, the Tenth in
Tademy v. Union Pacific Corp. also denied the defendant’s
summary judgment.152 The plaintiff in Tademy had come upon a
life-size hangman’s noose that was suspended from an industrial
wall clock.153 The court, relying upon Hollins along with Vance,154
recognized the atrocity of the noose by stating, “like a slave-masters
whip, the image of a noose is deeply a part of this country’s collective
consciousness and history, any further explanation of how one could
infer a racial motive appears quite unnecessary.”155 Until Henry v.
Regents,156 each Circuit that has taken on the issue regarding the

The noose in this context is a symbol not just of racial discrimination or
of disapproval, but of terror. Those of us for whom a particular symbol is
just that—a symbol—may have difficulty appreciating the very real, very
significant fear that such symbols inspire in those to whom they are
targeted. No less than the swastika or the Klansman’s hood, the noose
in this context is intended to arouse fear.
Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F. 2d 1503, 1583 (11th Cir. 1989)
(Fay, J. dissenting).
147. Porter, 576 F.3d 626 at 636.
148. Id. at 627.
149. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, supra note 134. The
court ultimately held that the plaintiff could not succeed on his hostile work
environment claim. Id. However, the court noted they did not need to “[lay]
down . . . firm rules for when a noose in a workplace is or is not severe” because
the plaintiff failed the fourth element of the claim—a basis for employer
liability. Id.
150. Hollins v. Deltha Airlines, 238 F. 3d 1255, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001).
151. Id. at 1257-58.
152. Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2008).
153. Id. at 1137.
154. Hollins, 238 F. 3d 1255 at 1256-58; Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 863 F. 2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989).
155. Tademy, 614 F. 3d 1132 at 1142 (citing Johnson v. Potter, 177 F. Supp.
2d 961, 965 (D.Minn.2001)); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388 (2003).
156. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 644 Fed. Appx. 787, 788 (9th Cir.
2016).
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severity of the noose has found the object to be severe enough to
succeed on a hostile work environment claim.157

B. The Mistakes within the Henry Decision158
The holding in Henry159 not only created a split between the
circuits, but was a decision that relied upon the wrong standards to
determine severity and that analogized Henry’s situation to
factually dissimilar cases. Moreover, the District Court placed a
concerning emphasis on who the noose was directed at—a method
that fails to hold all types of perpetrators accountable and ignores
the well documented history of the hangman’s noose and other
historically racist objects.
To begin with, the District Court had found that Henry’s
incident involving the noose was not as severe when compared to
other cases, and as such, he could not meet the third element of a
hostile work environment claim.160 But this comparison was
erroneous. A hostile work environment claim required Henry to
show conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to alter his work
conditions—not conduct that, when compared to other cases, was as
severe.161 The standard for determining the severity of conduct
within hostile work environment actions was long ago established
by the U.S. Supreme Court as an objective one.162 The objective test
asks whether a reasonable person would find the conduct to be
sufficiently severe as to alter one’s work conditions.163 If the
reasonable person were to conclude this, the conduct would be said
to be sufficiently severe.164 Even though the objective standard has
been the prevailing test to determine severity in hostile work
environment causes of actions since Harris v. Forklift Sys.,165 the
District Court never explicitly applied it to Henry’s action.166
Because of this, the District Court failed to adequately analyze
Henry’s action as set forth by precedent167 and accordingly, the
District Court could not have correctly concluded that Henry’s claim
was not sufficiently severe.

157. Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F. 3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009);
Hollins, 238 F. 3d 1255; Vance, 863 F. 2d 1503 at 1511; Tademy, 614 F.3d 1132
at 1141; Henry, 644 Fed. Appx. 787.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1087 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
161. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986).
162. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1087 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
167. Harris, 510 U.S. 17 at 21.
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The District Court’s decision was also erroneous due to two
faulty analogies. The first misguided analogy occurred when the
District Court determined the severity of Henry’s claim by
comparing it to Bolden v. PRC Inc.,168 a case that had been decided
in the Tenth Circuit. In Bolden, isolated racial comments were
alleged as the sufficiently severe conduct—a fact pattern drastically
different from Henry’s.169 While multiple racial epithets can create
a cause of action for a hostile work environment claim,170 courts
continue to hold that an “employer’s mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee”
cannot form the basis of a hostile work environment claim under
Title VII.171 The citation to and reliance upon the Tenth Circuit
decision was not analogous to the facts presented by Henry and
therefore, flawed. The difference between isolated incidents
involving racial epithets and an isolated incident involving a noose
is one that has been recognized since the beginning of the hostile
work environment jurisprudence.172 The Supreme Court explicitly
recognized this notion in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson.173
Because the District Court failed to acknowledge the distinction
between cases involving racial epithets and ones involving a
severely racist object, the conclusion they came to in Henry’s cause
of action was improper. If the court had analogized the case to one
that involved a noose, such as the ones decided in the Seventh,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, presumptively, the District Court
would have come to the same conclusion as those circuits had.174
The second flawed comparison was committed when the
District Court found Henry’s situation to be more in line with the
incident involved in McCoy v. City of New York.175 The court in
McCoy found an alleged incident of a noose could not be termed
“pervasive” because it did not “occur in concert or with a regularity
that can reasonably be termed pervasive.”176 This standard is not a
168. Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F. 3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994); Henry, 37 F.
Supp. 3d 1067 at 1069.
169. The court cited to Bolden v. PRC Inc., where the Plaintiff had alleged
isolated incidents of racial enmity such as being called a “nigger” and being told
he better be careful “because [the Defendants] know people in the Ku Klux
Klan.” 43 F. 3d 545 at 551; Henry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067 at 1069.
170. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F. 2d 1406, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1987);
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F. 2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981).
171. This notion was first recognized in Rogers. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d
224, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
172. Id.
173. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986).
174. Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F. 3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009);
Hollins v. Deltha Airlines, 238 F. 3d 1255, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001); Vance v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F. 2d 1503, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989); Tademy v.
Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2008).
175. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2014); McCoy v. City of New York, 131 F. Supp. 2d 363, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
176. Id.
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requirement of a hostile work environment claim nor recognized by
any other circuit.177 An incident does not need to occur in concert or
with a regularity to be considered sufficiently severe or pervasive.
As previously discussed, the objective standard is the test used to
determine severity or pervasiveness.178 Moreover, several courts
have held that an extremely serious isolated incident can support a
hostile work environment action on its own.179 Therefore, the court’s
reliance upon McCoy was misguided.180
Aside from the District Court applying imprecise severity tests
to Henry’s claim and equating the case to factually dissimilar
situations, the Court additionally erred when it failed to view the
facts of Henry’s case in a light most favorable to him as required of
a motion for summary judgment.181 Thus, the Court was unable to
see the similarities between his allegations and that of Smith v.
Town of Hempstead.182 In Smith, two African-American plaintiffs
found a noose hanging on the wall in an area where the employees
regularly gathered.183 The District Court in Henry relied heavily
upon the statement in Smith that the noose had been hung in “an
area where all African American employees would pass that
morning.”184 This fact was vital to the Court as it indicated the noose
was directed at the plaintiffs or at African-American employees as
a whole.185
In Henry, the Plaintiff alleged that the noose was hung in the
Facilities Maintenance Inventory Warehouse.186 While it can be
argued that there is confusion within Henry’s allegations
concerning who discovered the noose,187 it can be contended that the
noose was discovered within a warehouse that almost all Building
Maintenance employees would pass through.188 Although it is not
177. Id.
178. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
179. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (noting
that isolated incidents that are “extremely serious” can amount to
discriminatory changes in the “terms and conditions of one’s employment.”);
McCoy, 131 F. Supp. 2d 363 at 374.
180. Id.
181. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
182. Smith v. Town of Hempstead, 798 F. Supp. 2d 443, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
183. Id. at 448.
184. Id.
185. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
186. Id. at 1075.
187. The court discussed how Henry’s complaint had stated he saw the noose
on July 10,2012, but an email from the Superintendent and a written statement
from Cornel Nickelson (a co-worker) both claimed Nickelson had discovered the
noose. Id. at 1074. However, Henry’s opposition brief noted both he and
Nickelson were the ones who found the noose. Id. Furthermore, there was
evidence to support the idea that the Superintendent’s email was discussing a
different incident in which Nickelson, alone, had discovered a noose on the roof
of the School of Nursing. Id.
188. Id.
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certain that every single African-American employee would pass by
the noose, it can at least be argued that the location of the noose
was in a similar location as the one in Smith and it was within an
area that most employees would traverse.189 If the Court had been
viewing Henry’s facts in the light most favorable to him, their
analysis of Smith should have varied dramatically.
The District Court’s most concerning mistake, however,
derives from its concentration on Henry’s inability to allege facts
that showed the noose was specifically directed at him or any other
African-American employee.190 To signify the importance of this
showing, the District Court cited to two cases decided outside their
district:191 Wilson v. NYC Dept. of Transportation and Smith v.
Town of Hempstead.192 In Wilson, a noose was hung outside of the
plaintiff’s locker.193 While in Smith, the noose was found in a central
garage where all African American employees would pass
through.194 Both plaintiffs in these cases could allege facts that
demonstrated the nooses were directed at themselves or other
African-American employees.195 The issue with demanding a
plaintiff to make this showing is that it fails to hold accountable
those who claim they were hanging the noose as a prank, in protest
to a different issue, or that they did not know the history of the
noose and its connection to African-Americans.196
These excuses are common in incidents that involve racist
objects. For example, in Henderson v. Int’l Union, two incidents of
noose hanging were alleged.197 In the first occurrence, the culprit
contended he was from “the east coast” and had just been
absentmindedly tying knots without knowing the racial history of
the particular knot he was tying.198 The second offender argued he
hung the noose to express concerns that “the union ought to be hung
for failing to accomplish certain measures with regard to profit
sharing.”199

189. Smith v. Town of Hempstead, 798 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
190. The court focused on two cases outside its district that had found a
single display of a noose sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.
Both cases, per the court, were decided as they were because the Plaintiff could
prove the nooses were directed at them or African-American employees in
general. Henry, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067 at 1087.
191. Id.
192. Wilson v. NYC Dept. of Transportation, No. 01 Civ. 7398 (RJH), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Smith, 798 F. Supp. 2d 443 at 453.
193. Wilson, No. 01 Civ. 7398 (RJH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620 at *22.
194. Smith, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
195. Id.; Wilson, No. 01 Civ. 7398 (RJH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21620, at
*22.
196. Bell, supra note 31, at 338 (discussing the various explanations that
Defendants have given for tying and hanging a noose).
197. Henderson v. Int’l Union, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1250 (D. Kan. 2003).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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In Jena, Louisiana, during a high school assembly, an AfricanAmerican student asked the principal “whether Black students
could sit under the tree in the center of campus.”200 The question
was said to have been asked as a joke.201 The following day,
however, nooses were found hanging from a tree in the center of
campus.202 The white students who were found to have hung the
nooses stated they did “not intend to invoke the nooses’ racist
legacy” and stated they “had no knowledge of the history concerning
nooses and black citizens.”203 The hanging of a noose at a workplace
has also been excused as a prank by many perpetrators.204 However,
these explanations, particularly the claim of not knowing the racial
connotations of the noose, are hard to swallow given the symbolism
of the noose in today’s society.205
Even disregarding the fact that forcing a plaintiff to
demonstrate who the noose was directed at fails to account for
excuses put forth by perpetrators, the emphasis on this showing is
still a cause for concern. Given the history of the noose and what it
represents to African-Americans, it should be self-explanatory that
a noose displayed where nooses are not generally found represents
a threat directed at African-Americans.206 African-Americans who

200. Id.; Susan Roesgen & Elliot C. McLaughlin, Residents: Nooses Spark
School Violence, Divide Town, CNN (Sept. 5, 2007), www.cnn.com/2007/US/
law/09/04/bell.jena.six/index.html.
201. Roesgen & McLaughlin, supra note 200.
202. Id.
203. Bell, supra note 31, at 338; Craig Franklin, Media Myths About the Jena
6: A Local Journalist Tells the Story You Haven’t Heard, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Oct. 24, 2007), www.csmonitor.com/2007/1024/p09s01-coop.html.
204. Bell, supra note 31, at 339-40; Jake Wagman, Noose’s Revival is Raising
the Issue of Intent, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 18, 2008), www.amren.com/
news/2008/01/nooses_revival/; see, e.g., Newton v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 85 F.
3d 595, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(a burning cross that was displayed in an AfricanAmerican’s work area was said to have been a prank); Police Officers for Equal
Rights v. Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393, 402 (S.D. Ohio 1985)(a worker’s wearing
of white sheets and the burning of a cross was claimed to be a joke); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Browning, 598 F. Supp. 421, 412 (D. Or. 1983)(another cross burning
that was alleged to be a prank); United States v. Hooper, 4 M.J. 830, 831
(A.F.C.M.R. 1978)(cross burning that took place on Friday the 13th was seen as
a joke); Garrison v. Conklin, No. 234243, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 337, 5 (Ct.
App. Feb. 14, 2003)(a burning cross was claimed to be a Halloween prank).
205. Modern depictions of slavery within the media are becoming
increasingly common within the 21st century. See 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Regency
Enterprises 2013)(portraying the journey of a freed African-American from the
North who was captured and placed into slavery in the South); see LINCOLN
(2012)(showing the plight of slaves during the Civil War and how the
Emancipation Proclamation came to be created); see DJANGO UNCHAINED ( The
Weinstein Company 2012)(following the story of a freed slave who is attempting
to save his wife from enslavement); see THE BIRTH OF A NATION (Bron Studios
2016)(a graphic remake of the 1915 movie that tells the story of the slave, Nat
Turner, and his revolt).
206. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
supra note 60; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
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witness a noose or other historically racist objects in the workplace
should not have to illustrate the history of these objects and
demonstrate why they invoke certain emotions. The noose has been
a recognized racist symbol since before the Civil Rights
Movement.207 This fact alone should be enough to satisfy the court’s
question of whether a noose hanging in a work environment, where
African-Americans are employed, is directed at African-Americans.
Notwithstanding the numerous errors committed by the
District Court, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the lower
court’s finding in a short opinion.208 The Ninth simply agreed that
the isolated incident of a noose in Henry’s claim was not sufficiently
severe to alter the conditions of his employment and that he was
unable to provide evidence that demonstrated racial motive behind
the incident.209
1. The Objective Standard
Although the District Court and the Ninth Circuit erred on
multiple occasions in Henry,210 the exact dilemma in the decision
lies with the third element of the hostile work environment claim.
As laid out in Harris v. Forklift Sys., to succeed on the third element
of a hostile work environment claim, a victim must prove certain
conduct was both subjectively and objectively sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter their work conditions.211
The objective test requires the judge or the jury to ask whether
a reasonable person in the same or similar situation would find the
alleged conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter
their work conditions.212 This reasonable person, which first
emerged in 1837 through Vaughan v. Menlove,213 is a hypothetical
supra note 52.
207. Id.
208. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
209. Id. at 789.
210. Id.
211. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
212. Id. at 21 (affirming that “conduct not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s
purview.”).
213. Shailin Thomas, Vaughan v. Menlove —“The Unreasonable Hay
Stacker”, H20.LAW.HARVARD.EDU, h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/4855 (last
updated June 2, 2014). This seminal case revolved around the issue of whether
the defendant, Menlove, had committed gross negligence. Id. The standard for
determining negligence, at this time, was whether the person could be said to
have acted as a “prudent man” would have acted in the same situation. Id. The
defendant argued that this “prudent man” standard should take into account
certain characteristics of the defendant. Id. In his case, he contended that
because he was of lower intelligence, the hypothetical “prudent man” should
also take on that quality. Id. As such, the defendant argued he was not negligent
because a “prudent man” in his situation, with his lower IQ, would have done
the same as he did. Id. The court rejected this characterization and held that
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individual who adheres to the generally accepted standards of
society.214 While in theory this hypothetical being may sound
pragmatic, in practice the usage of the reasonable person standard
has been widely criticized215 for its failure to encompass the
difference between how a reasonable white person would react and
how a reasonable minority group would react.216
The reasonable person, although meant to be gender and race
neutral, often takes on a white, male persona.217 In the hostile work
environment realm, this white male standard becomes problematic
as only 8.6% of racial harassment cases are brought by white
plaintiffs.218 This means that even though over 90% of hostile work
environment claims will be brought by a minority race, the severity
of their claim will still be judged by the white, male-biased
reasonable person standard.219 Herein lies the problem with using
an objective test in hostile work environment claims—especially
those that involve a historically racist object. A noose or a Ku Klux
this “prudent man” does not take on a defendant’s personality/characteristics.
Id. It is a hypothetical person who acts as a standard, reasonable person would.
Id.
214. Id.
215. See generally, Mayo Moran, Symposium: Who is the Reasonable Person?
The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233 (2010) (discussing the controversy surrounding the
use of the reasonable person standard); see Meri O. Triades, Article, Finding a
Hostile Work Environment: The Search for a Reasonable Reasonableness
Standard, 8 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.L. J. 35, 39 (2002) (analyzing the various
reasonable person standards utilized by the courts in hostile work environment
claims involving sexual harassment).
216. See, Naomi R. Cahn, Symposium: The Looseness of Legal Language:
The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1398, 1404 (1992) (reflecting the standard’s inability to apply to women as
there is a “male bias inherent” within the reasonable person standard).
217. During the evolution of the reasonable person standard, lawmakers
were almost exclusively white males and therefore, the legal standard
continued to take on a white male bias. Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Article,
“Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My” or “Redskins and Braves and Indians, Oh
Why”: Ruminations on McBride v. Utah State Tax Commission, Political
Correctness, and the Reasonable Person, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 11, 27-8 (1999)
(citing BRUE WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUSTICE 7 (1987)):
Today various studies have found serious inequities in our judicial
system. One reason, blacks believe, is because those who administer the
systems of justice are mostly white males.) They bring to their
professions the same habits of prejudice that are inseparable from the
lives they have lived, their white neighborhoods, their white clubs and
the privileges of a white skin that they have always enjoyed.
Id.; Sarah McLean, Comment, Harassment in the Workplace: When Will the
Reactions of Ethnic Minorities and Women be Considered Reasonable?, 40
WASHBURN L.J. 593, 601 (2001) (citing United States Initial Report to the
United Nations Committee on The Convention on the Elimination of all forms
of Racial Discrimination).
218. Chew and Kelley, supra note 68, at 64.
219. Id.
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Klan hood is not going to appear as severe to a white person as it
would to an African-American.220
This notion is demonstrated within multiple racial harassment
cases that have employed the reasonable person standard.221 To
combat this issue, some have proposed the use of a race specific
test.222 This has been come to be known as the reasonable black
person standard. This standard was adopted within Harris v.
International Paper Co.223 and Williams v. New York City Housing
Authority224—both of which found for the plaintiff. Despite the
outcomes in these two cases, simply changing the name of the test
has not been shown to have the desired effect the proponents of the
change are looking for.225 In an empirical study conducted by
Barbara A. Gutek, she found that altering the jury instructions from
a reasonable person to a reasonable woman had “little if any effect”
on the participants’ judgments.226 Gender and race inevitably shape

220. See Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2327 (1989)
(stating that “the typical reaction of target-group members to an incident of
racist propaganda is alarm and immediate calls for redress.) The typical
reaction of non-target group members is to consider the incidents isolated
pranks, the product of sick-but-harmless-minds.” Id.
221. Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., Civ. No. 85-CV-74031-DT 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15759 (E.D. Mich. May 6, 1987). A hostile work environment claim
was brought by the two African American Plaintiffs against the factory they
were employed at. Id. at *10. They alleged severe discriminatory conduct that
included racially offensive graffiti on the bathroom walls, a training poster that
included an inept worker, labeled with the same name as one of the Plaintiffs,
that was shaded to represent a black person, racial epithets that were used in
conversations on a daily basis, white employees refusing to eat lunch with the
black employees and refusing to shower in the stalls that the black employees
used. Id. at *11. Despite the plethora of allegations, the court did not find the
conduct actionable. Id. They concluded that racial slurs were a “part of the
workday world of the factory” and the Plaintiffs had assumed the risk of this
harassment by working in an environment they had been warned was bias. Id.;
Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F. 2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1982). The Plaintiff,
an African American male, was an employee of an oil rig. Id. at 923. He claimed
he was referred to by his co-workers as “nigger”, “coon”, and “blackboy.” Id. The
Plaintiff further alleged ammonia was poured on top of him while he was
showering, he had hot coffee poured into his back pocket, and he was stripped
down naked and had his genitals greased with oil. Id. at 924. Furthermore, a
toolshed on the oil rig had had “KKK” written across it. Id. The Fifth Circuit
found in favor of the Defendants, noting that “hazing and practical joking should
be viewed realistically as male interaction and not atypical of the work
environment involved.” Id.
222. Triades, supra note 215, at 56.
223. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991);
224. Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth.,154 F. Supp. 2d 820 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
225. Barbara A. Gutek, Maureen Ann O’Connor, Renee Melancon, Tracey
M. Geer & Robert S. Done, The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard
in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy
Examination, 5 PYSCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 596, 623 (1999).
226. Id.; Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable
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how a person will react to a certain situation.227 It follows that
without having a standard that reflects these differences, the cases
involving a non-white or woman plaintiff will fail to reach the fairest
outcome for that plaintiff.
Unfortunately, Gutek’s study demonstrates that using a nonneutral reasonable person standard is not the ideal method of
providing judges and juries a way in which to view the case from a
different perspective.228 Despite the jury instructions the
participants in the study received, they continually came to the
same conclusion for the Plaintiff.229 Gutek’s findings signify that
inconsistent results will continue to pervade hostile work
environment claims, even if the reasonable black person standard
was adopted by each court.
The decision in Henry perfectly demonstrates the inability of
the race-specific test to truly comprehend the perspective of an
African-American who witnesses a racially charged object.230
Although the District Court did not overtly apply the objective
standard to Henry’s action, it noted in their final paragraph that “a
reasonable African-American would have been offended by being
confronted with such an emotionally-charged symbol in the
workplace.”231 It appears the Court did slightly contemplate the
objective standard and even considered it from a reasonable
African-American person’s viewpoint.232 However, despite using the
race-specific test and faintly recognizing the connection between the
noose and African-American history,233 the District Court still found
that a noose would only “offend” the reasonable AfricanAmerican.234
These race-specific or gender specific standards do not get at
the heart of the matter—removing the inherent biases that both
judges and jurors unconsciously, or consciously, have. When it
comes to recognizing the atrocity of the noose and other historically
racist objects, these null results will not suffice. It is time for the
U.S. to recognize the downfalls of employing the objective standard

Woman: Does it Matter?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 633, 649-50 (2002)
(an empirical study that came to the same conclusion as Gutek).
227. Matsuda, supra note 220, at 56.
228. Gutek, supra note 222, at 623.
229. Id.
230. Henry v. Regents of the Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1087 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The Court, for the first time in the opinion, noted the impact that
the history of the noose may have on African-Americans. Id. They stated that
“even if the noose was not directed specifically at plaintiff, because of the legacy
of slavery and its aftermath, a reasonable African-American would have been
offended . . . .” Id.
234. Id.
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in hostile work environment claims that involve historically racist
objects and to provide a more concrete test.

IV. PROPOSAL
The objective test has failed victims who have faced historically
racist objects time and time again.235 The test has an inherent
inability to account for the racist significance of the noose and its
impact upon African-Americans who come upon it within their
workplace.236 Although race-specific objective tests have been
successful in some cases,237 the resulting decision within Henry238
indicates that more adamant steps need to be taken to combat the
atrocity of the noose.
This Comment advocates that when historically racist objects
are alleged within a hostile work environment claim, the severe or
pervasive element should be found to have been met per se. The per
se approach disposes of the objective test altogether, thereby ridding
the courts and the jury of grappling with the issue of whether they
would have found the conduct to be sufficiently severe. Enacting
statutes that deem nooses, swastikas, and KKK hoods per se
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter one’s work conditions will
provide consistency on the volatile subject and help demonstrate
America’s willingness to confront their atrocious history with
African-Americans in reconciling manner.

A. Providing Consistency
Per se designations allow for specific conduct or incidents to be
deemed as having met certain legal standards by, of, or in itself.239
Essentially, to satisfy a legal element, no other evidence is needed
other than the conduct was committed or the incident occurred.240
When applied to hostile work environment claims, if the plaintiff
can show that a noose was displayed at their place of employment,
then they will have met the sufficiently severe or pervasive element
without having to provide any further evidence. The objective

235. Chew and Kelley, supra note 68, at 64 (finding that Plaintiffs in hostile
work environment claims lose 80% of the time).
236. Matsuda, supra note 220, at 2320 (discussing how non-target groups
consider racist propaganda incidents to be isolated pranks).
237. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991); see
also Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
238. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 644 Fed. Appx. 787, 788-89 (9th
Cir. 2016).
239. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Per se, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/per%20se (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
240. Cornell University Law School, Per Se, LAW.CORNELL.EDU www.law.co
rnell.edu/wex/per_se (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

2017]

Reconciling the History of the Hangman’s Noose

163

portion of the severity element would be removed thus eliminating
its core problem.
The fundamental issue inherent in the use of the objective test
is that it does not rid jurors and judges of their inherent biases.241
Consequently, the results of hostile work environment claims are
inconsistent as they are dependent upon the internal prejudices of
the different triers of fact. While this inconsistency may be tolerable
in cases that involve allegations of “mere utterances of racial
epithets” and other racially offensive conduct, this discrepancy will
not do for incidents that involve a symbol that has been explicitly
recognized as one embodying racism and violence.242 By removing
the objective test and replacing it with the per se method, hostile
work environment claims that allege conduct involving a noose
would no longer produce inconsistent results.
Consistency in this specific cause of action is needed given the
known history of the noose, what it stands for, and the failure of
non-victimized groups to truly comprehend its symbolism.243
Although many may understand the history of the noose, those who
are not within the group that has been historically victimized by it
are unlikely to have the same reaction to seeing it within their
workplace. Courts ruling under the per se method could account for
this inability to perceive the noose in the same way as the victim—
providing consistency on the matter. In essence, the per se approach
would require the courts to recognize the African-American’s
perception of the noose—a deference the history of the object
adamantly demands.
Furthermore, the per se method would hinder perpetrators
from using a noose within the workplace for supposed non-racial
reasons. While the noose is widely seen as a symbol of racism, a
surprising number of defendants within hostile work environment
claims have argued they did not know the history of the noose or
they believed they were committing a harmless prank.244 When it
comes to an object that represents the murders of thousands of
African-Americans, no such justification should be permitted even
if it is valid. In today’s world, not knowing the history of the noose
is a difficult excuse to comprehend.245
Even if a perpetrator intended the display of the noose to be a
joke, those who are the target of the noose are highly unlikely to
perceive it as such.246 Employing the per se approach would
241. Cummings, supra note 214.
242. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (the court held that
a “mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings” will not arise to a Title VII violation).
243. Matsuda, supra note 220, at 2320.
244. Bell, supra note 31.
245. See 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Regency Enterprises 2013); LINCOLN (2012);
DJANGO UNCHAINED (The Weinstein Company 2012); THE BIRTH OF A NATION
(Bron Studios 2016).
246. Matusda, supra note 217, at 2320.
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enlighten those who claim to not know the history of the noose and
deter the alleged pranksters from using the object as such. Because
this method would cement the element of “sufficiently severe or
pervasive enough” in favor of the Plaintiff from the beginning, a
Plaintiff’s success on the cause of action would be more likely.247 As
such, those who may wish to pull a prank using a noose would be
more hesitant to do so.
While the per se method can be criticized for not allowing any
justification for conduct, this is a small price to pay for ensuring the
background of the noose is recognized consistently as pervasive or
severe enough to alter the victim’s work environment. Moreover,
plaintiffs whose allegations involve the noose are not guaranteed an
outright win with the implementation of the per se method. The
plaintiff would still have to prove the other elements required
within a hostile work environment claim.248 As such, defendants
would still have a chance to put forth a defense.
Other critics of employing the per se approach in hostile work
environment claims may argue it has First Amendment
implications. However, the decision in Virginia v. Black provides
strong precedent for allowing a per se noose statute to pass
constitutional muster.249 The U.S. Supreme Court held in Virginia
that the “First Amendment permits [statutes] that outlaw cross
burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross
is a particularly250 virulent form of intimidation.” Within the
opinion, the Court noted that “the Klan used cross burnings as a
tool of intimidation and threat of impending violence.”251 The
burning of a cross, during the Lynching era, was a warning that
violence was going to occur.252 With lynching at the height of its use
during this time, this violence was most likely going to be carried
out with the hangman’s noose.253 Intrinsically, the hangman’s noose
is not a tool of intimidation like the burning cross but rather an
247. Chew and Kelley, supra note 68, at 84. As of 2006, Defendants were
successful in 81% of racial harassment cases.
248. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 667 (1986).
249. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). The respondents in this
case were all convicted, on separate occasions, of violating a Virginia crossburning statute. Id. at 348. One respondent had led a Ku Klux Klan rally in
which a cross was burned. Id. The other respondents had attempted to burn a
cross on the lawn of African-Americans. Id. at 350. The respondents argued that
the Virginia cross-burning statute was facially unconstitutional because it
chilled the expression of speech protected under the First Amendment. Id. at
351.
250. Id. at 363.
251. Id. at 354.
252. Id.; Wilson R. Huhn, Cross Burning as Hate Speech Under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, AMSTERDAMLAWFORUM.ORG, am
sterdamlawforum.org/article/view/103/184#sdendnote5anc (last visited Apr. 5,
2017).
253. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
supra note 20, at 28.
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actual tool of violence. As such, there should be no need for the per
se statute to consider the intent of the perpetrator. The hangman’s
noose, in and of itself, should be seen as much more than just a
vehicle of intimidation. Given this and following the logic in
Virginia v. Black, a per se statute concerning the hangman’s noose
would not run afoul of the First Amendment because it is more than
a tool used to terrorize, it is an actual tool of violence.254

B. Unification
America has never had a commendable record when it comes
to its treatment towards African-Americans. While many believe
that the worst of it is over, the fact is that the status of today’s race
relations within America is still far from stellar.255 Although
lynching does not occur as often or as publicly as it did during the
1900s, racial hatred is still as prevalent. It merely exists at a less
overt level.256 Furthermore, the Presidency of Donald J. Trump257 is
already expected to damage race relations further.258 In the eighth
month of President Trump’s presidency, an alternative-right rally
turned violent, and then deadly, when a proclaimed white
supremacist ran his car into a crowd of counter-protestors.259 In his
first remarks following the bloody protest, President Trump failed
to condemn the white supremacist groups, including the various
KKK groups who participated in the rally, and stated that there was
“hatred, bigotry, and violence” emanating from both sides of the
rally.260 These events provide the perfect backdrop for the
254. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354 (2003)
255. Russonello, supra note 11; Norman, supra note 11.
256. See Natalie Musumecl, KKK Celebrating Trump’s Election with Victory
Parade, N.Y. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), nypost.com/2016/11/11/kkk-celebratingtrumps-election-with-victory-parade/ (With the election of Donald Trump,
various KKK chapters throughout the U.S. have surfaced to celebrate); Jaweed
Kaleem, The Ku Klux Klan says it will hold a Trump Victory Parade in North
Carolina, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguid
e/la-na-updates-trail-guide-kkk-trump-north-carolina-1478822255-htmlstory.h
tml (One of the largest Ku Klux Klan groups in the country announced it would
hold a parade to celebrate the then President-elect Donald Trump’s win.) The
group is cited as having between 150 and 200 members and as being one of the
most active Klan groups in the U.S. today. Id.
257. Associated Press, Trump Elected President in Surprise Win,
NEWSELA.COM (Nov. 9, 2016), newsela.com/articles/2016-trump-win/id/23866/.
258. Shiva Manima, Many Voters, especially blacks, expect race relations to
worsen following Trump’s election, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 21, 2016),
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/21/race-relations-following-trumps-el
ection/ (stating that polls indicated nearly half of U.S. voters expect Trump’s
election to the Presidency to worsen race relations).
259. Maggie Astor & Christina Caron, A Guide to the Violence in
Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/c
harlottesville-virginia-overview.html.
260. Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump is Criticized for Not Calling
Out White Supremacists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), www.nytimes.

166

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:137

implementation of the per se method in hostile work environment
claims.
Given Congress’ failure to effectively recognize the atrocity of
the noose and their complicity with the lynching that occurred by
it,261 reconciliation in this area would best be achieved through
them. The passage of a statute that explicitly says the noose is
sufficiently severe or pervasive enough will recognize the
experiences and perceptions of African-Americans. The courts will
be acknowledging that as a different race, African-Americans may
have a diverse understanding or reaction to a certain object.
Congress will be taking into consideration the background of
African-Americans and America’s history towards them.
Recognizing the role that the U.S. has played in the shaping of
African-American’s lives is an empathetic step that speaks of peace
and reconciliation.

V. CONCLUSION
In Henry,262 the issue presented was of paramount significance
given the history of the hangman’s noose and the status of race
relations within the United States. Title VII, the statute under
which Henry’s hostile work environment claim is brought, was
enacted to dispel racial discrimination. Yet in 2016, the Ninth
Circuit failed to recognize one of the most racially charged objects
in the history of African-Americans as being severe or pervasive
enough to alter a victim’s work environment.263 This failure is
directly attributable to the objective element required within the
third element of a hostile work environment claim.
This Comment proposes the implementation of a per se method.
The per se approach rids the courts of the objective view, which has
caused not only a circuit split, but inconsistencies across the board.
The history of the noose calls for a more reliable viewpoint. By
recognizing in a significant, concrete way that the hangman’s noose
does have an atrocious history that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive enough to alter one’s work conditions, Congress will be
acknowledging the bloodied past the U.S. has with AfricanAmericans thereby taking a step towards further reconciliation or
understanding between the two races in a time where it is needed
the most.

com/2017/08/12/us/trump-charlottesville-protest-nationalist-riot.html.
261.S. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005-2006). Senator Mary Landrieu stated,
before voting took place, “There may be no other injustice in American history
for which the Senate so uniquely bears responsibility.” Thomas-Lester, supra
note 75.
262. Henry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 644 Fed. Appx. 787 (9th Cir.
2016).
263. Id.

